# Post-quantum cryptography migration

> Why post-quantum cryptography (PQC) matters to SMBs and what it changes.

- Source: https://stevenfoerster.com/lab/pqc/migration/

Lab

Why post-quantum cryptography (PQC) matters to SMBs and what it changes.

Educational demo - don't copy/paste into production

All cryptography runs locally in your browser. Keys and plaintext never leave your device, but this is still a simplified demo.

- [Lattices](https://stevenfoerster.com/lab/pqc/lattices/)
- [LWE](https://stevenfoerster.com/lab/pqc/lwe/)
- [ML-KEM](https://stevenfoerster.com/lab/pqc/ml-kem/)
- [ML-DSA](https://stevenfoerster.com/lab/pqc/ml-dsa/)
- [SLH-DSA](https://stevenfoerster.com/lab/pqc/slh-dsa/)
- [Learn](https://stevenfoerster.com/lab/pqc/learn/)
- [Migration](https://stevenfoerster.com/lab/pqc/migration/)

What this is

A practical guide to post-quantum cryptography (PQC) migration: what breaks, why it matters for smaller teams, and how to prioritize real-world change.

Who it's for

-   Security leaders planning PQC timelines.
-   Platform teams updating TLS, VPN, and SSH stacks.
-   Builders who need a risk-based migration plan.

## Why Post-Quantum Cryptography matters (even for SMBs)

Most SMBs assume PQC is a future enterprise problem. That assumption is risky.

## The core problem: harvest now, decrypt later

Attackers can capture encrypted traffic today, store it cheaply, and decrypt it in the future when quantum computers mature.

Anything with long-term sensitivity is at risk:

-   Customer PII
-   Password databases
-   API secrets
-   Government or regulated data (CUI, HIPAA, FINRA, etc.)
-   VPN captures
-   TLS session recordings

Once the cryptography is broken, there is no retroactive fix.

## What quantum computers break (and what they don't)

Cryptography that will break

These are vulnerable to Shor's algorithm.

Algorithm

Used for

RSA

TLS certs, SSH keys, VPNs

ECDSA

Certificates, code signing

ECDH

TLS key exchange

Ed25519

SSH, Git, APIs

Cryptography that survives (mostly)

These are not broken by known quantum attacks.

Algorithm

Notes

AES-256

Safe (use 256-bit keys)

SHA-256 / SHA-384

Safe with larger hashes

HMAC

Safe

Symmetric crypto survives. Public-key crypto does not.

## What is Post-Quantum Cryptography?

Post-Quantum Cryptography uses new math that resists known quantum attacks. The most important standards come from NIST's Post-Quantum Cryptography project.

Purpose

Algorithm

Key exchange

ML-KEM (formerly CRYSTALS-Kyber)

Digital signatures

ML-DSA (formerly CRYSTALS-Dilithium)

Alt signatures

SLH-DSA (SPHINCS+); Falcon/FN-DSA (FIPS 206) is still draft as of March 2, 2026

Most real-world deployments today use hybrid crypto: classical + PQC together.

## What tools and protocols are impacted

TLS / HTTPS

Every website, API, and reverse proxy.

Termination at load balancers, Cloudflare/CDNs, NGINX, Traefik.

Status: hybrid PQC TLS is already shipping in some stacks.

SSH

Admin access, Git operations, automation pipelines.

Status: modern OpenSSH versions support hybrid PQC key exchange.

VPNs

Site-to-site tunnels, remote access, zero-trust overlays.

Impacted: WireGuard, IPsec, OpenVPN. Captured VPN traffic is valuable later.

Certificates & PKI

Internal CAs, code signing, device identity, and mutual TLS are hardest to migrate.

Long-lived encrypted data

Backups, object storage, database dumps, encrypted file archives.

If encrypted today with vulnerable public-key crypto, it may be readable later.

## Practical risks if you do nothing

Risk

Impact

Regulatory exposure

Regulatory exposure in future reviews

Breach amplification

Old data becomes readable

Contractual liability

Government & enterprise contracts

Forced emergency migration

Costly, rushed, error-prone

Loss of customer trust

Silent long-term compromise

For government contractors and regulated industries, this becomes a contractual requirement, not an option.

## How SMBs should approach PQC (realistically)

1.  1\. Inventory public-key usage. Ask where RSA/ECC is used, where TLS terminates, which VPNs/SSH servers exist, and which certificates are long-lived.
2.  2\. Enable hybrid crypto first. Hybrid modes protect you today and allow fallback if PQC algorithms change.
3.  3\. Prioritize high-value targets. Start with VPNs, admin access, APIs, backups, and internal PKI.
4.  4\. Track vendor readiness. Ask for PQC TLS roadmaps, hybrid support, and FIPS plans.
5.  5\. Don't roll your own crypto. Use maintained OS libraries and standardized algorithms.

## Common misconceptions

-   "Quantum is decades away." Not true: attackers can harvest encrypted traffic now and decrypt it once quantum computers mature.
-   "We'll just re-encrypt later." You can't fix already-captured traffic.
-   "This only matters to governments." SMBs are easier targets and hold valuable data.

## What good looks like in 2026

-   Hybrid PQC enabled on TLS termination, SSH, and VPNs.
-   AES-256 everywhere for symmetric encryption.
-   Short certificate lifetimes and documented vendor roadmaps.
-   No long-term secrets relying on RSA/ECC alone.

This is achievable without breaking production.

## Final thought

SMBs that start now will migrate calmly. Those that wait will migrate under pressure.
